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Cet article utilise l’expérience naturelle issu de la reforme fiscale de 1986 
pour évaluer l’incidence d’une réduction de la période d’acquisition des droits 
de pension sur la mobilité des travailleurs américains couverts par un régime 
de pension à prestations déterminées. Nous appliquons des méthodes de 
différence des différences sur les données du Survey of Income and Program 
Participation pour estimer l'impact de cette réforme sur le groupe affecté. Nos 
résultats suggèrent que la réforme n'a eu aucun effet significatif sur la mobilité 
volontaire du travail du groupe de traitement. Nos résultats sont robustes à 
l'utilisation de différents groupes témoins et estimateurs de différence des 
différences. 1 Introduction
Federal policy regarding the portability of pension rights has been an important issue
of public debate in the US since the 1960s. Approximately 40 percent of pension
plans had no vesting provisions before the Employees’ Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) of 1974 established minimum vesting standards. The Tax Reform Act
of 1986 (TRA86) further reduced the maximum vesting period required for pension
rights’ accrual from 10 to 5 years of plan participation.
Since this policy debate, which was driven by ef￿ciency and equity considerations,
most of the empirical investigations have focused on the likely effects of enhanced pen-
sion portability on retirement income and employee productivity. On the one hand sim-
ulation studies1 suggest that despite shorter vesting periods, bene￿t losses associated
with job turnover are still signi￿cant in some cases for workers participating in de￿ned
bene￿t (DB) plans. On the other hand, while participation in employer-sponsored pen-
sion plans is found to be strongly correlated with less frequent quits and layoffs,2 there
is disagreement over whether reduced job mobility arising from nonportable pensions
enhances or reduces the ef￿ciency of labor markets.3
Policy reforms reducing the length of the vesting periods have been enacted in the
last two decades in most industrialized countries with widespread employer-provided
pension coverage,4 yet no empirical study has formally evaluated the impact of these
policies. This paper contributes to ￿ll this gap using the natural experimental design
introduced by TRA86 to study the impact of a reduction in vesting provisions on the
voluntary job mobility of US private sector prime-aged employees using data from the
Survey of Income and Programme Participation (SIPP). Given the typical structure of
1See Clark and McDermed (1988); Employee Bene￿t Research Institute (1987).
2Mitchell (1983); Allen et al. (1988, 1993); Andrietti and Hildebrand (2001).
3See Dorsey (1995) for a review of the literature.
4See Andrietti (2002) for a review of the reforms implemented in the United States, Canada, Ireland,
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.
1US employer-provided pension plans, this reform affects workers participating in a DB
plan with 5 to 10 accrued years of service, but is not expected to have any effect on
workers with similar years of service who do not participate in a DB plan. The lat-
ter group includes workers participating in an employer-provided de￿ned contribution
(DC) plan and all those without any employer’s pension coverage. In order to identify
the effect of the reform, we adopt a difference-in-differences strategy, which compares
the pre-post reform change in voluntary job mobility for workers treated by the reform
against workers with similar characteristics who are not affected and therefore taken
as the control group. Our results suggest that the reform has no statistically signi￿cant
impact on voluntary job mobility of the DB workers. This ￿nding is robust to model
speci￿cations, the choice of different control groups and pre-post reform samples.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes employer provided
plans and their vesting provisions in the US. Section 3 introduces our empirical strat-
egy. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Employer Provided Plans, Vesting Provisions and the
1986 Tax Reform Act
Employer-provided pension plans typically fall into one of two broad categories: DB
and DC. In a traditional DB plan, each employee’s future bene￿t is determined by a
speci￿c formula and the plan provides a nominal level of bene￿ts upon retirement. The
typical ￿￿nal pay￿ formula relates pension bene￿ts to the length of service and the ￿-
nal salary received with the pension promise usually being funded through employers’
contributions. DC plans provide for periodic contributions into an individual pension
account for each worker, where contributions may be made by the ￿rm and/or the
workers. The level of bene￿t at retirement is determined by the total amount of contri-
2butions and the rate of return of each individual’s retirement assets. Although different
types of DC plans5 are offered in the US, most of them have the so-called 401(k) op-
tion, which allows participant employees to make pre-tax contributions.6 In principle,
employers can establish 401(k) plans that rely entirely on voluntary employee contri-
butions. However, they usually offer matching contributions up to a prespeci￿ed limit.
Individuals enrolled in either DB or DC type pension plans are subject to a vesting
period before being fully entitled to their pension rights. Once vested, a worker can
quit her job and retain the legal right to receive the future pension bene￿t to which she
hasbeencontributing. PriortotheEmployeeRetirementIncomeSecurityAct(ERISA)
of 1974, there were no required vesting standards. ERISA established three primary
vesting rules contingent on the minimum plan participation standards, which initially
allowed plans to exclude workers under the age of 25, those working less than 1,000
hours annually and those within 5 years of normal retirement age (not to exceed age
65).7 Under cliff vesting, participants were granted full (100-percent) rights to all ac-
cumulated bene￿ts only after completing 10 years of plan participation. Under graded
vesting, the employee had to be at least 25-percent vested in the plan’s accrued bene￿ts
after 5 years of plan participation with increases in this percentage phased in over the
next 5 years of service, reaching 100 percent vesting after 15 years. Finally, under the
third vesting standard known as the rule of 45, an employee with 5 or more years of
plan participation had to be at least 50 percent vested when the sum of the employee’s
age and the employee’s years of plan participation reached 45, with increases of the
nonforfeitable pension rights’ percentage under a ￿xed schedule. ERISA also stipu-
lated shorter vesting schedules for the so-called class year plans, which were de￿ned
as pro￿t sharing, stock bonus, or money purchase plans providing for an employee’s
5Money purchase plans, saving and thrift plans, pro￿t sharing plans, stock bonus plans and employee
stock ownership plans.
6401(k) plans are also referred to as salary reduction plans, as participating workers’ take-home pay
is reduced to make contributions to the plan.
7Employee Bene￿t Research Institute (1986).
3rights to contributions for each plan year separately. In this case, the plan had to ensure
a 5-year vesting schedule for employer contributions with 100 percent vesting no later
than the end of the ￿fth plan year. In addition, plans could allow participants to vest
more quickly than the minimum standards set by law. TRA86 introduced shorter vest-
ing schedules and reduced the vesting options available to employers. Private single
employer plans were allowed to provide either cliff vesting after 5 years of service or
graded vesting of 20 percent after 3 years of service and 20 percent for each subsequent
year of service with full vesting reached after 7 years. The class vesting schedule was
eliminated. These changes became effective for plan years beginning on January 1,
1989.
Graham (1988) uses data from the 1986 Employee Bene￿t Survey administered to
medium and large private-sector ￿rms to determine the in￿uence of ERISA on vesting
schedules. According to his survey, the vast majority of individuals participating in DB
plansweresubjecttoa10-yearcliffvestingschedule, 13percentweresubjecttograded
vesting schedules and overall only 10 percent of participants were offered more liberal
vesting time schedules than those prescribed by ERISA. This is compared to DC plan
participants where more than one quarter of workers were given immediate full vesting
while a minority of participants were offered cliff vesting within 5 years. Finally,
most graded and class vesting schedules were providing full vesting after 5 years of
service. Similar ￿gures are provided by Kotlikoff and Smith (1983). This constitutes
evidence that the vesting schedules of nearly all DB plans needed to be amended to
complywiththenewstandardsintroducedbytheTRA86, whilemostDCplansalready
provided much more liberal vesting schedules than those prescribed by ERISA and
therefore were already in compliance with the new legislation. Currently, most DC
plans allow for the immediate vesting of employee contributions, while virtually all
DB plans impose ￿ve year vesting periods (Woods, 1993).
43 Empirical Strategy
The preceding evidence suggests that reductions in the vesting period required to be-
come eligible to claim accrued pension rights introduced by TRA86 almost exclusively
affected workers enrolled in DB plans with 5 to 10 years of service. Thus, the reform
provides a transparent exogenous source of variation that determines treatment assign-
ment. We exploit this naturally occurring experimental design to evaluate job mobility
responses of pension-covered workers to the reduction in vesting provisions using a
difference-in-differences (DD) strategy. This commonly used quasi-experimental es-
timator allows us to measure the impact of TRA86 by comparing the difference in
voluntary job mobility rates between workers enrolled in employer-provided DB plans
with 5 to 10 years of service (the treatment group) with comparable respondents not
participating in any DB plan (the control group).
Both DC-covered workers and workers in nonpension jobs (with 5 to 10 years of
service) provide potentially suitable comparison groups because these workers were
not affected by TRA86. However, it is well known that workers in nonpension jobs
differ from pension-covered workers in both observable and non-observable charac-
teristics (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1993). In particular, there is widespread evidence
that pension-covered workers are on average better educated, command higher wages
than their non-covered counterparts and are intrinsically less mobile (Gustman and
Steinmeier, 1993). The existence of common time-speci￿c shocks across both groups,
which is a critical assumption underlying the validity of the DD approach, is more
likely to hold when both the control and the treatment groups share comparable char-
acteristics.8 Thus, DC-covered workers constitute our preferred control group given
its similarities with the treatment group. However, we also integrate workers in non-
pension jobs as an alternative control group to assess the robustness of our estimates
8See, for instance, Meyer (1995) for a detailed discussions.
5to different sources of potential bias. In particular, given the differences in observables
between nonpension workers and the treatment group, one might suspect that both
groups could potentially exhibit differential responses to macroeconomic shocks, thus
violating a fundamental identifying assumption of the DD estimator. A robust set of
results from multiple control groups would, however, strengthen our belief that we are
actually identifying the true effects of the vesting reform and not merely the effect of
other contemporaneous changes or trend differences between the control and treatment
groups.
We ￿rst implement a conventional linear DD estimator and offer additional robust-
ness checks from difference-in-differences matching (DDM) following the methodol-
ogy outlined in Heckman et al. (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998). The standard unad-
justed (raw) difference-in-differences model is captured by the following equation:
Mi = ￿0 + ￿1DBi + ￿2Posti + ￿3Posti ￿ DBi + "i (1)
where dummy variables DBi and Posti denote respectively whether individual i is
in the treatment group (DB-covered) and observed after the policy reform. Common
unobservable differences among groups are controlled for by the variable DBi; while
Posti controls for common macroeconomic effects. The coef￿cient ￿3 of the interac-
tion between these two variables measures the raw impact of the reform. The outcome
variable Mi is a binary variable equal to one if a worker experienced a voluntary job-
to-job transition.
We also consider an augmented speci￿cation by adding a vector of demographic
and job-related characteristics Xi:
Mi = ￿0 + ￿1DBi + ￿2Posti + ￿3Posti ￿ DBi + ￿Xi + "i (2)
6The adjusted DD model allows us to control for differences in observables between ob-
servations in the treatment and the control groups. It has also the advantage of reducing
the residual variance of the regression, which yields more ef￿cient estimates (Meyer,
1995). Given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable Mi, we assume that
the equation errors are normally distributed and estimate a probit model.
In addition to standard DD estimates, we provide further robustness checks from
difference-in-differencesmatching.DDMcombinestraditionalmatchingmethodswith
difference-in-differences.9 This estimator offers more ￿exibility than the above men-
tioned traditional DD estimator as one does not need to impose a linear functional form
to estimate the conditional expectation of the outcome of interest. Unlike traditional
matching, DDM is robust to the existence of systematic time-invariant unobserved dif-
ferences between the control and the treatment groups (Heckman et al., 1997, 1998).
Given the nature of our data, we implement our DDM estimator on repeated cross-
sections as a two-way propensity score matching by pairing each worker covered by a
de￿ned bene￿t pension with a member(s) in the control groups that exhibit similar ob-
servables both in the pre- and the post reform periods. Formally, following the notation



























where I1A; I1B denote the sets of DB-covered workers in the periods following and
preceding the implementation of TRA86 and SP is the region of common support.
Both n1B and n1A capture the number of DB-covered workers for which we ￿nd a
match in the pre and post-reform periods. Y B
0i (Y A
1i) is a dichotomous variable equal
to one if a DB-covered respondent experienced a voluntary job transition in the pre
9See among others, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Heckman et al. (1997), Blundell and Dias (2000)
and Smith and Todd (2005) for detailed discussion on matching methods and difference-in-differences
matching.
7(post)-reform period. ^ Y A
0i and ^ Y B
0i denote the corresponding counterfactual outcomes
which are constructed as the weighted average outcomes of seemingly comparable non








0j; t = fA;Bg; k = f1;0g (4)
where I0B (I0A) denotes the sample size of the control group in the pre (post) -reform
period and wij denotes the speci￿c weights assigned to each control j in the estimation
of the counterfactual outcome of treated respondent i. The value of the latter depends
on the distance between the propensity scores of i and j and the choice of the matching
algorithm. To check the sensitivity of our results to the choice of matching estimator,
we consider four different matching procedures; single nearest neighbor, radius match-
ing, kernel and local linear matching.10
4 Data
The data used for this analysis is drawn from pooling the 1984, 1996, 1990, 1992 and
1996 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Each survey
year is a short rotating panel made up of 8 to 12 waves of data ￿ collected every 4
months ￿ for approximately 14,000 to 36,700 U.S. households.11 The choice of these
particular panel years is motivated by the timing of the implementation of TRA86 and
the availability of pension coverage information. Both the 1984 and 1986 panels cover
the pre-reform period, while subsequent surveys cover the post-reform period. By
10All our estimates were obtained using the psmatch2 STATA module of Leuven and Sianesi (2003)
11Each survey year typically covers a time span ranging from 2 1/2 years to 4 years. In particular,
SIPP 1984 spans over 32 months from October 1983 to July 1986; SIPP 1986 spans over 28 months
from January 1986 to April 1988, SIPP 1990 spans over 32 months from February 1990 to September
1992, SIPP 1992 spans over 40 months from February 1992 to April 1995 and SIPP 1996 spans over 48
months from April 1996 to March 2000.
8pooling these panel years, we construct a unique synthetic panel, which allows us to
fully exploit the quasi-experimental design of TRA86 using difference-in-differences
methods.
Each SIPP panel collects core module questions that are common to each wave and
topical module questions that provide in-depth information on particular topics that
are usually not updated in each wave. We draw pension data from the topical module
on pension coverage.12 We use this information to assign each worker a (mutually
exclusive) pension participation status; either participating in a DB plan, participating
in a DC plan or not participating in any pension arrangement. Since speci￿c individual
plan characteristics of pension-covered respondents are not available in the SIPP data,
we rely on ￿gures provided by Graham (1988) and Kotlikoff and Wise (1985) and
assumethatthetypicalvestingscheduleofDBplansbeforeTRA86wasacliff with10-
year vesting and where the typical vesting schedule of DC plans provided full vesting
within 5 years.
We exploit the longitudinal design of the core module questions to identify job
transitions for each respondent over a four-wave period. In particular, our observation
period spans waves four to seven of the 1984, 1986, 1990 and 1992 panels, and waves
seven to ten of the 1996 panel.13 Employees who experienced a voluntary job tran-
sition are the most pertinent units for our analysis. However, prior to the 1996 panel,
SIPP did not collect explicit information regarding the reasons behind a job change.
As a result, we have constructed a proxy measure that considers whether a move is vol-
untary when a worker switches jobs without any intervening spell of unemployment
over the period during which we observed each respondent.
12Topical modules on pension coverage were collected in wave 4 of each panel year used in this paper
with the exception of SIPP 1996, which collected pension coverage information in wave 7.
13The ￿rst wave of observation corresponds to the wave in wich the pension coverage module was
collected in each survey year. We restricted the observation period to four waves given that the 1986
survey collected seven waves of data and that SIPP 84 lost an entire rotating group after wave 7.
9We restrict our sample to individuals in full-time employment working in private
sector ￿ non-agricultural, non-construction ￿ ￿rms in the last month of the reference
period. We exclude agricultural and construction workers due to the idiosyncratic
nature of job turnover in these sectors. In particular, construction workers are unique in
boththehighlyseasonalnatureoftheirworkandthetendencyfortheirpensionplansto
be provided by unions in the form of multiemployer plans.14 The latter eliminates most
of the portability issues arising in single-employer plans by considering service with
multiple employers under the same plan as if the individual had worked continuously
for the same employer. Thus, construction workers usually combine high turnover with
little discontinuity of pension coverage. In the same fashion, public sector workers are
excluded, as they experience different patterns of turnover and because public pension
plans usually have more generous portability provisions.15 Finally, to avoid sample
selection issues related to labor market entry at a young age and exit at an advanced
age, we restrict our sample to prime-age workers between 25 and 50.
As previously discussed, we consider two control groups: workers with 5 to 9
years of job tenure covered by a DC plan and nonpension workers with similar years of
service. We estimate our models on two different samples. The ￿rst sample (Sample 1)
uses the 1984 and 1986 panels as pre-reform data and the 1990, 1992 and 1996 panels
as post-reform data. In order to account for the progressive enactment of the reform,
we also consider a more restrictive sample in which only the 1992 and 1996 panels are
used to cover the post-reform period (Sample 2).
Table 1 reports the weighted mean values of relevant characteristics of the treat-
ment and control groups for both samples. We ￿nd differences in job mobility rates
across all groups of workers. Consistent with Gustman and Steinmeier (1993), the re-
ported differences are signi￿cantly more important between nonpension (control group
14See Weinstein and Wiatrowski (1999)
15See Foster (1994).
102) and pension-covered workers (treatment group and control group 1). As expected,
pension-covered workers and nonpension workers appear to differ along other dimen-
sions as well. DB and DC-covered workers earn on average higher wages than non-
pension workers, are better educated, are more likely to own their own home and to be
working in large ￿rms. Nonpension workers are signi￿cantly less likely to be union
members than their pension-covered counterparts. However, a signi￿cant difference in
union coverage is also observed between workers covered by DC and DB plans. About
30 percent of DB-covered workers are union members. This ￿gure drops to 13 percent
amongst DC-covered workers and just below 9 percent for nonpension workers. This
￿nding is consistent with the well-documented union advantage in fringe bene￿ts ￿
including pension coverage ￿ and the fact that most union-negotiated pension plans
are of the de￿ned-bene￿t type (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005). Overall, the
￿gures reported in Table 1 corroborate ￿ndings from earlier studies that both DB and
DC-covered workers share similar observable characteristics, which allows the latter
to exist as a particularly suitable comparison group.
Figure 1 illustrates the incidence of voluntary job mobility of workers from our
treatment and control groups over our observation period. Interestingly, it shows a
sudden surge in job mobility of DB-covered workers in the period following TRA86
implementation. However, the mobility trend of DC-covered workers displays an al-
most identical pattern. This latest observation could suggest that the observed surge
in the job mobility of DB-covered workers re￿ects a response to contemporaneous
macroeconomic shocks that are common to pension-covered workers independently
of TRA86 reforms. This ￿nding provides additional support to our identifying as-
sumption that both groups of pension-covered workers are indeed equally affected by
macroeconomic shocks. On the contrary, unlike pension-covered workers, nonpension
workers experienced a fairly smooth and constant increase in job mobility, which sug-
11gests that macroeconomic shocks might have a differential impact on this latter group.
Table 2 summarizes the trends displayed in Figure 1 and presents the average vol-
untary job mobility rates for the treatment and control groups with their respective
sample sizes in the pre- and post-reform periods for each of our two samples. The
￿gures reported con￿rm the observed higher voluntary job mobility for all groups of
workers in the period following TRA86 implementation. More precisely, the increase
in mobility of DB-covered workers ranges from 2.28 percentage points in sample 1
to 3.25 percentage points in sample 2. We ￿nd similar ￿gures for DC-covered work-
ers with an increase of 2 percentage points in sample 1 and 2.92 percentage points in
sample 2, while nonpension workers’ job mobility increased by about 4 percentage
points.
Both the trends in mobility across groups reported in Figure 1 and the statistics
reported in Table 2 provide preliminary evidence that the pension reforms introduced
by TRA86 probably did not trigger the observed surge in voluntary job mobility of
DB-covered workers. The difference-in-differences estimates, discussed in the next
section, provide a more rigorous evaluation of this preliminary assessment.
5 Estimation Results
Tables 3 and 4 report standard difference-in-differences results based on the estimation
of three model speci￿cations on two samples using DC-covered workers and nonpen-
sion workers respectively as comparison groups. Columns 1 and 4 report the unad-
justed (raw) difference-in-differences marginal effects of the reform from estimating
equation (1). Note that the latter are easily derived from the mobility rates reported
in Table 2 by subtracting the pre/post mobility differential of each control group from
that of DB workers. These unadjusted estimates con￿rm our preliminary observation
12that the reduction of the vesting requirements did not yield a statistically signi￿cant
increase in the job mobility of DB-covered workers relative to those covered by a DC
plan. Similar results are found when nonpension workers are used as the comparison
group (see Table 4).
Because the treatment group and the control groups may differ in demographic and
job-related characteristics, the observed differences in job mobility outcomes could
simply re￿ect the underlying differences between the treatment and control groups
ratherthanatreatmenteffect. Hence, controllingfordemographicandjob-relatedchar-
acteristics is important if the composition of the treatment and control groups changes
over time and some of these characteristics are correlated with the outcome of interest.
In addition, controlling for demographic and job-related characteristics reduces the
residual variance of the regression and produces more ef￿cient estimates. To account
for these differences and to check the robustness of our estimates to model speci￿-
cation, we provide additional sets of results from the estimation of two alternative
speci￿cations of equation (2). The ￿rst speci￿cation includes controls for personal and
family-related characteristics16proxying for mobility costs. The second speci￿cation
is augmented by the addition of job-related17 and local labour market18 characteristics.
Industry dummies - with the manufacturing industry as the reference group - and oc-
cupation dummies - with blue-collar occupations as the reference group - are included
to proxy for industry and occupation speci￿c turnover rates faced by individuals. We
report the adjusted marginal effects of the policy in columns 2 and 3 for sample 1 and
in columns 5 and 6 for sample 2.19 Overall, we ￿nd that the unadjusted estimates are
robust to the inclusion of controls for demographics and job related characteristics.
16In particular, we control for job potential experience, education, race, marital status, the number of
children aged less than 18, family size and geographical areas (SMSA as well as regions).
17Included are dummy variables for ￿rm size, union status, industry and occupation, and continuous
variables for log-hourly wage and job tenure.
18State unemployment rates.
19Full estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
13Regardless of the sample and the comparison group considered, we consistently ￿nd
no statistically signi￿cant evidence that TRA86 pension reform had any impact on the
job mobility decisions of DB-covered workers.
Finally, furtherrobustnesschecksareprovidedfromdifference-in-differencesmatch-
ing by estimating equation (3). Following the methodology outlined in Section 3, we
use several matching algorithms to pair each DB-covered respondent ￿ in the region of
common support ￿ with a weighted average of the control group’s respondents based
on the value of their propensity scores20 in the pre- and post-reform periods. Each
resulting individual counterfactual outcome is then used to derive an estimate of the
mean difference in outcomes in both periods. The difference-in-differences matching
estimates are obtained by subtracting the post- and the pre-reform mean difference
estimates in job mobility, and are reported in Tables 5 and 6. These estimates corrob-
orate unambiguously both the unadjusted and adjusted regression results; the vesting
reform of TRA86 did not succeed in its main objective of fostering the voluntary job
mobility of workers ￿tied￿ to jobs offering an occupational pension plan with a long
vesting period. Moreover, the fact that the treatment effect coef￿cient (￿) is robust to
the inclusion of additional controls and estimation methods implies that any changes in
the composition of the treatment and control groups that occurred over time are most
likely uncorrelated with the treatment.
6 Conclusions
Thispaperexploitsthenaturalexperimentaldesignofthereductioninvestingperiodas
introduced by TRA86 to evaluate the voluntary job mobility response of the affected
20The variables used to determine propensity scores include personal family-related characteristics,
job-related characteristics and local labour markets characteristics. Full estimation results are available
upon request from the authors.
14respondents; workers participating in a DB plan with 5 to 10 years of service. We
adopt a difference-in-differences strategy that compares the pre-post reform change in
voluntary job mobility for workers affected by the reform relative to two groups of
workers: DC-covered workers and nonpension workers who are not affected by the
reform and therefore taken as the control group.
Our results unambiguously support that TRA86 had a no statistically signi￿cant
effect on the voluntary job mobility rate of the treated group. Our estimates are ro-
bust to the choice of control groups, pre/post reform samples and estimation methods.
Though the reform reduced the pension loss of workers participating in DB plans, it
was ineffective in its main purpose of fostering the job mobility of workers ￿tied￿ to
jobs by an employer-provided plan with a long vesting period. This is perhaps not
surprising in the light of earlier contributions which failed to establish that the lack
of pension portability was a key factor in explaining the well documented lower job
mobility rate of pension-covered workers (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1993; Andrietti
and Hildebrand, 2001). In addition, pension-covered workers are more likely to hold
jobs offering better level of compensation and more generous fringe bene￿ts, including
health insurance, which is believed to generate a non-negligeable amount of job lock
(Madrian, 1994; Buchmueller and Valletta, 1996). This evidence casts doubt on the
effectiveness of policies targeting one particular program in isolation, and support the
view that workers in ￿good jobs￿ are simply less likely to move.
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18Table 1: Sample Means of Characteristics for Treatment and Comparison Groups
Treatment Group 1 Group 2
DB:5-9 yrs DC:5-9 yrs No Pension
s1 s2 s1 s2 s1 s2
Demographics
Job Mobility (%) 6.6 6.9 7.5 7.9 10.6 10.2
Hourly wage 12.3 12.4 12.0 12.1 9.6 9.7
Age 35.3 35.2 35.0 35.1 34.7 34.7
Education (years) 14.2 14.1 14.1 14.1 13.1 13.0
Non-single (%) 75.2 75.2 72.8 73.2 65.4 65.7
Children<18 (%) 58.4 59.3 57.4 58.4 51.5 51.8
Black (%) 11.7 11.7 10.1 10.4 13.4 13.7
Family size 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.2
Housing tenure (%) 74.4 74.1 72.9 72.6 63.1 63.1
Job tenure 6.9 6.9 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.5
Firms<100 (%) 54.9 48.6 53.7 48.2 29.7 25.3
Union coverage (%) 28.6 27.8 13.5 13.0 8.8 8.9
Health coverage (%) 92.8 93.2 90.1 90.1 76.0 75.1
Industry
Mining 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.2 1.4
Manufacturing 37.5 37.0 34.8 34.9 30.0 29.9
Transp.,Comm. 16.0 16.3 10.0 9.8 10.1 9.3
Wholesale trade 6.5 6.7 9.5 9.3 9.6 9.8
Retail trade 7.0 7.4 13.3 14.2 18.4 18.1
Finance, Insur. 5.8 5.3 5.8 5.1 2.4 2.5
Other services 24.9 24.9 24.1 23.8 26.5 26.9
Occupation
Professional 35.5 34.1 35.1 35.9 21.9 21.8
Tech., Service 27.9 28.1 30.0 28.9 35.0 34.7
Blue Collar 36.6 37.8 34.9 35.2 43.1 43.6
Region
SMSA 59.8 58.7 60.0 58.6 62.6 63.2
Midwest 25.9 25.7 29.6 29.2 26.0 26.4
Northeast 23.1 22.2 18.9 19.0 21.5 21.8
South 30.9 31.7 31.8 32.1 29.8 29.5
West 19.5 19.6 18.9 18.6 22.0 21.3
N 1823 1454 1496 1135 1478 1068
Note: All means weighted using SIPP person weights. S1 incluces data from the 1984, 1986, 1990, 1992
and 1996 SIPP surveys. S2 includes data from the 1984, 1986, 1992 and 1996 SIPP surveys. Hourly wage
de￿ated using Monthly CPI-U BLS, Base=82-84.
19Table 2: Pre-Post Reform Mobility Rates of Treatment and Control Groups
Sample 1 Sample 2
Pre Post Pre Post
DB-Covered 5.14 7.42 5.14 8.39
( 545) (1278) ( 545) ( 909)
DC-Covered 6.18 8.18 6.18 9.10
( 366) (1130) ( 366) ( 769)
All w/o Coverage 8.14 11.89 8.14 11.96
( 397) (1081) ( 397) ( 671)
Note: All means weighted using SIPP person weights. The number of observations in each cell is
reported in parentheses. Sample 1: Pre reform=1984 & 1986 panels and Post reform=1990,1992
& 1996 panels. Sample 2: Pre reform=1984 & 1986 panels and Post reform=1992 & 1996 panels.
Sample 3: Pre reform=1984 panel and Post reform=1996 panel
Table 3: Difference-in-Difference Estimates: DC- Covered Workers
Sample 1 Sample 2
Raw M1 M2 Raw M1 M2
POST*DB 0.285 0.620 0.453 0.340 0.798 0.695
(0.886) (0.772) (0.829) (0.877) (0.729) (0.759)
DB -1.045 -1.331 -0.845 -1.045 -1.431 -1.089
(0.517) (0.474) (0.644) (0.517) (0.454) (0.563)
POST 2.001 1.859 1.540 2.916 2.783 3.172
(0.194) (0.217) (0.310) (0.087) (0.092) (0.076)
Note: All estimations are weighted using the SIPP person weights. P-values are reported in paren-
theses. Sample 1: Pre reform=1984 & 1986 panels and Post reform=1990,1992 & 1996 panels.
Sample 2: Pre reform=1984 & 1986 panels and Post reform=1992 & 1996 panels.
20Table 4: Difference-in-Differences Estimates: Nonpension Workers
Sample 1 Sample 2
Raw M1 M2 Raw M1 M2
POST*DB -1.468 -0.905 -0.937 -0.568 -0.177 0.142
(0.509) (0.689) (0.675) (0.815) (0.941) (0.952)
DB -3.002 -3.451 -2.441 -3.002 -3.407 -3.072
(0.087) (0.088) (0.225) (0.087) (0.091) (0.126)
POST 3.754 3.407 2.986 3.824 4.012 3.969
(0.041) (0.026) (0.049) (0.054) (0.015) (0.018)
Note: All estimations are weighted using the SIPP person weights. P-values are reported in paren-
theses. Sample 1: Pre reform=1984 & 1986 panels and Post reform=1990,1992 & 1996 panels.
Sample 2: Pre reform=1984 & 1986 panels and Post reform=1992 & 1996 panels.
21Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Matching Estimates (Sample 1)
1-Nearest Radiusa Kernelb Local Linearc
Neighbor Matching Matching Regression Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Group 1 1.01 0.54 0.69 0.82 0.53 0.54 0.82 1.28 0.21 0.44
(2.286) (2.258) (2.084) (2.073) (2.310) (1.910) (2.014) (2.617) (2.131) (2.087)
Group 2 -0.36 0.91 -1.39 -1.13 1.10 -0.99 -1.14 1.74 -0.05 -0.33
(2.342) (3.556) (2.842) (2.141) (3.437) (2.736) (2.152) (3.553) (3.081) (3.183)
Note: Own calculation from the SIPP data. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. Triming level 5.aCaliper=0.02,0.2 and 2.bKernel
Bandwidth = 0.02,0.2 and 2. cLocal Linear regression bandwidth is 0.02,0.2 and 2
Table 6: Difference-in-Differences Matching Estimates (Sample 2)
1-Nearest Radiusa Kernelb Local Linearc
Neighbor Matching Matching Regression Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Group 1 1.63 0.86 1.00 1.33 0.74 0.85 1.33 1.24 0.97 0.86
(2.477) (2.398) (2.319) (2.212) (2.425) (2.232) (2.112) (2.761) (2.458) (2.288)
Group 2 1.44 2.21 0.48 -0.27 2.42 0.52 -0.26 2.87 1.61 0.72
(2.703) (3.844) (2.836) (2.321) (3.906) (3.265) (2.344) (3.884) (3.423) (3.491)
Note: Own calculation from the SIPP data. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. Triming level 5.aCaliper=0.02,0.2 and 2.bKernel
Bandwidth = 0.02,0.2 and 2. cLocal Linear regression bandwidth is 0.02,0.2 and 2
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